Ethno-Racial Appeals and the Production of Political Capital: Evidence from Chicago and Toronto

Jan Doering

Abstract
Ethno-racial appeals mobilize individuals through their social categories. Such appeals matter especially in municipal elections, where partisan cues are often absent and turnout is low. This article presents findings from an analysis of ethno-racial appeals in 914 campaign documents from the 2014 Toronto and 2015 Chicago municipal elections. It reveals that campaigns frequently target non-White and White ethnic voters through explicit appeals. These appeals do not fit into the existing framework of racial priming theory. Drawing instead on Bourdieu’s theory of capital, the article conceptualizes ethno-racial appeals as attempts to produce or destroy a candidate’s political capital among specific groups. Campaigns do this directly by making claims about the group’s purported interests or indirectly by invoking candidates’ relevant cultural or social capital. Analyzing ethno-racial appeals in this way helps to comprehend the mobilization of non-Whites, illuminates the production of ethno-racial voting, and contributes to the understanding of place-based culture.

Keywords
race and ethnicity, campaign appeals, municipal elections, Chicago, Toronto

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It is a social science truism that race and ethnicity are fundamentally political categories. As Max Weber (1978) wrote, “all history shows how easily political action can give rise to the belief in blood relationship” (p. 393). Race and ethnicity inform a broad range of political behaviors, including voting, protest, and social movement participation (Dawson 1994; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). At the same time, ethno-racial categories are not inherently salient in political—and more broadly, social—life but rather have to be activated in specific social contexts (Brubaker 2004; Brubaker et al. 2006; Jackson 2001; Nagel 1994; Wimmer 2013). Very often, political leaders and organizations perform this task of activation when they have to turn out protesters, solicit donations, convince citizens to sign a petition, or win re-election. To do so, they can make ethno-racial appeals (Mendelberg 2001), which activate, reinforce, or even produce beliefs about the political implications of ethno-racial group membership.

Race and ethnicity presumably matter especially in municipal elections, where turnout is low and partisan cues are often absent (Kaufmann 2004; Trounstine 2013). Scholars have repeatedly documented the strong effect of ethno-racial categories on urban voting (Barreto 2007; Bird et al. 2016; Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Kaufmann 2004; Philpot and Walton 2007; Wolfinger 1965). Nevertheless, the specific mechanisms—including ethno-racial appeals—that produce ethno-racial voting have rarely been examined in detail (but see Benjamin 2017, Metz and Tate 1995). How, precisely, do campaigns make ethno-racial appeals in municipal elections?

Even beyond municipal elections, the mechanisms that produce ethno-racial voting remain elusive. The extensive literature on racial priming (e.g., Huber and Lapinski 2006; Mendelberg, 2001, 2008; Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi 2016; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017) offers a partial answer, showing how implicit appeals activate Whites’ racial resentments, but studies in this tradition tend to draw on experimental rather than field data (Hutchings and Jardina 2009) and focus almost exclusively on the mobilization of White voters (but see White 2007). Therefore, this literature overlooks important types of appeals. First, appeals certainly do target non-White and White ethnic voters (Nteta and Schaffner 2013). Second, appeals to such voters may not have to remain implicit, because the taboo of overtly using race when mobilizing Whites (see Mendelberg 2001) may not apply when mobilizing minority voters. A more comprehensive understanding of ethno-racial politics requires incorporating the mobilization of all groups and possibly also a broader typology of appeals.

This article provides a detailed analysis of explicit ethno-racial appeals, drawing on a set of printed campaign material (914 documents from 269 candidates) from the 2014 Toronto and 2015 Chicago municipal elections.
Chicago and Toronto were chosen to maximize the chances of observing a broad range of ethno-racial appeals: Chicago has long been known for its high levels of racial contestation (Ferman 1996; Pinderhughes 2002), while Toronto is widely regarded as a successful model of multiculturalism that encourages “New Canadians” to participate actively in politics (Bloemraad 2006; Reitz and Lum 2006). Indeed, the article uncovers a rich landscape of appeals. While I identified only one clear instance of an implicit ethno-racial appeal targeting White voters, I found over 200 explicit appeals that targeted non-White and White ethnic voters. Analyzing these appeals together, the article provides unique insights into mobilization on the basis of race and ethnicity.

Since racial priming theory cannot account for explicit appeals or those targeting non-White and White ethnic voters, I develop a theory of explicit ethno-racial appeals as efforts to establish (or destroy) a candidate’s group-specific political capital (Bourdieu 1991), which holds value among group members but not necessarily beyond the group’s boundaries (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015). In trying to establish political capital, campaigns also invoke the candidate’s group-specific cultural and social capital that may ultimately be convertible into political capital (Bourdieu 1986, 1991). Furthermore, in trying to produce group-specific political capital, campaigns conjure and, thus, strengthen ethno-racial groupness (Brubaker 2004).

Empirically, this article suggests that researchers must look beyond the self-imposed boundaries of the racial priming literature with its focus on experimental data, implicit appeals, and the mobilization of Whites. In addition, the article makes three broader contributions. First, the findings indicate ethno-racial appeals as one likely mechanism that fosters ethno-racial voting on the municipal level. Second, the article calls attention to political campaigning as a mechanism in either hardening or changing place-based culture (Brown-Saracino 2015; Gieryn 2000; Kaufman and Kaliner 2011; Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen 2000). Essentially, low levels of segregation in Toronto turn elections in that city into multiculturalist moments as candidates celebrate the cultures of various ethno-racial groups to mobilize a broad range of voters. In Chicago, on the other hand, segregation makes such efforts pointless in many wards and instead encourages candidates to pledge maximal allegiance to one particular group, thus reproducing the city’s combative tradition. Third, the proposed theory of ethno-racial appeals may prove useful for the study of politics beyond the level of municipalities. In a development fundamentally inconsistent with racial priming theory, recent elections in the United States show that explicit appeals are now being used again even for the mobilization of White voters (Azari and Hetherington 2016; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017). Consequently, scholars need a theory of explicit ethno-racial appeals to adjust to the changed political circumstances.
Conceptualizing Ethno-Racial Appeals

The Theory of Racial Priming and Research on Ethno-Racial Appeals

Research in political science and political sociology examining ethno-racial appeals has concentrated on how implicit appeals to White voters activate racial (especially anti-Black) resentment (Gilens 1999; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo 2000). Mendelberg’s racial priming theory dominates this field (Haney-López 2014; Huber and Lapinski 2006; Hutchings and Jardina 2009; Mendelberg 2001, 2008). In her pioneering work, Mendelberg (2001) argues that, since the 1960s, explicit anti-Black appeals have largely disappeared from public discourse as Americans have embraced the norm of racial equality. While Whites continue to harbor stereotypes about Blacks, Mendelberg claims that these stereotypes are now best activated through implicit racial appeals, which do not contain overtly racist content. According to Mendelberg (2001), implicit appeals “replace racial nouns and adjectives with more oblique references to race [that] present an ostensibly race-free conservative position on an issue while incidentally alluding to racial stereotypes or to a perceived threat from African Americans” (pp. 8–9). A prime example is the 1988 Willie Horton campaign that aimed to discredit presidential candidate Michael Dukakis by showing images of a violent Black offender, who had assaulted a White couple while on prison leave during Dukakis’s time as governor of Massachusetts.

Mendelberg’s conceptualization of ethno-racial appeals closely tracks her substantive interest in anti-Black politics. Her work and most of the studies that have followed it do not examine messages that might mobilize members of other ethno-racial groups, such as African-Americans, Latinos, or various immigrant groups (Huber and Lapinski 2006; Hutchings and Jardina 2009; Mendelberg 2001, 2008; Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi 2016; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017; for an exception, see White 2007). Of course, to understand the political outcomes that elections ultimately produce, it seems critical to consider the mobilization of non-White voters, because electoral outcomes obviously depend on all voters. Another limitation of the racial priming literature is that it relies almost exclusively on experimental data. Studies in this tradition rarely draw on data from real political campaigns, instead investigating voters’ manipulability through vignette-based survey experiments (see Hutchings and Jardina 2009). Experiments have the advantage of revealing the precise effect of ethno-racial appeals, but they cannot reveal when, where, and how ethno-racial appeals actually appear in the world.
Research examining ethno-racial appeals retrieved from field settings is exceptionally rare, perhaps because such data are difficult to procure. Studies of urban politics reveal the importance of ethno-racial categories in municipal voting (e.g., Barreto 2007; Bird et al. 2016; Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Philpot and Walton 2007; Wolfinger 1965) but rarely illuminate the specific strategies that campaigns use to steer voters in this direction (but see Benjamin 2017). Even case studies of urban politics contain little detail in this regard (e.g., Ferman 1996; Kaufmann 2004; Stone 1989). Two studies that do build on ethno-racial appeals drawn from field data quickly move to quantify their results rather than exploring and describing the underlying data in any detail (Metz and Tate 1995; Nteta and Schaffner 2013). Overall, one might argue that scholars have actually paid more attention to campaign “deracialization” than to the strategic deployment of race. Deracialization research examines how non-White or White ethnic candidates strategically downplay race and ethnicity to mobilize at least some White voters (Collet 2008; Krebs and Holian 2007; Perry 1991). This work is important but presents only a partial picture of race and ethnicity in political campaigns.

Ethno-Racial Appeals Create or Destroy Group-Specific Political Capital

Racial priming theory cannot account for explicit ethno-racial appeals nor for those targeting non-White and White ethnic voters. To create a broader framework, the work of Pierre Bourdieu proves helpful. From a Bourdieusian (1991) perspective, candidates in any electoral campaign are trying to generate political capital that they can use to mobilize votes. In contrast to the concepts of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1986), political capital remains less developed in Bourdieu’s work (Swartz 2013), but he conceptualized political capital as a temporary credit of trust that its recipient can use for the purpose of mobilization (Bourdieu 1991). Political representatives must frequently reassert their political capital, because those extending their trust anxiously scrutinize their leaders for signs of neglect and betrayal (Bourdieu 1991). In democratic societies, the key moments for doing so are electoral campaigns. Bourdieu (1991) used the concept of political capital mainly for his discussion of the French party system, but, like other tools from Bourdieu’s theoretical framework, the concept of political capital is portable and can fruitfully be applied in different contexts (Bonikowski 2015).

One aspect of the concept has to be modified for the purpose of studying ethno-racial politics. In the realm of race and ethnicity, the value of political capital is not absolute but varies across ethno-racial boundaries (see Emirbayer and Desmond 2015, pp. 83–98). A legacy that endows a candidate with political
capital among the members of one group may not hold value among members of another. In fact, that same legacy may represent a liability among other groups, because a strong record of serving one group could have come at the expense of other groups and their members. Thus, in making ethno-racial appeals, candidates are trying to create not general but group-specific political capital, possibly at the expense of losing support among other groups.2

Bourdieu not only extended the concept of capital by adding further types, but he also examined how these types can be exchanged for one another (Bourdieu 1986; Swartz 1997). While he did not devote much attention to how political capital can be generated out of other forms of capital (but see Bourdieu 1991), the option of exchange plausibly exists in the realm of politics, too. Economic capital, for example, enables candidates to buy airtime, distribute campaign material, hold campaign events, and so forth (for an overview, see Jacobson 2015), which may ultimately generate political capital. In this article, I focus on the conversion of ethno-racial cultural and social capital into group-specific political capital.

Regarding cultural capital, recent waves of populist politics show that candidates must be perceived as “authentic” among their target audience. When appealing to the members of one’s ethno-racial group, this means presenting oneself as a self-conscious group member, steeped in its cultural heritage (Jackson 2005). This raises the question of whether politicians can have cultural capital among ethno-racial outgroups. By definition, an outsider cannot be an authentic group member, but work on populism reveals that members of the elite are sometimes quite successful at establishing cultural rapport with, for example, the poor (Garrido 2017). It makes sense then to suggest that similar outgroup credentials can exist in the realm of ethno-racial politics. I, therefore, also examine how outgroup candidates try to establish cultural capital by demonstrating their understanding of, and support for, the group’s cultural mores.

Candidates may also employ social capital in making ethno-racial appeals. Bourdieu (1986) defines social capital as “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition” (p. 248). To demonstrate their political capital, candidates may invoke their ties to individuals or organizations possessing an abundance of group-specific political or cultural capital. As I show, the primary mechanism for doing so is the political endorsement. Unlike other forms of ethno-racial appeals, endorsements have received some prior attention in scholarship on ethno-racial politics (see Barreto et al. 2008; Benjamin 2017).

In addition to creating group-specific capital, ethno-racial appeals may seek to destroy it. This is the case for many of the appeals that inspired the
racial priming literature. The infamous Willie Horton advertisements, for example, aimed to undercut Michael Dukakis’s political capital among Whites (Mendelberg 2001). Since these advertisements held Dukakis responsible for a gruesome Black-on-White crime, they suggested that Whites could not count on Dukakis to protect them from purported racial threats. Similarly, one can imagine that attacks might summon negative cultural capital (e.g., being on record as having used the “N-word”) and social capital (being linked to individuals or organizations that group members find repugnant). All of these attacks would aim to reduce a candidate’s group-specific capital and might ultimately cost them votes.

Finally, it is important to note that ethno-racial appeals do not only activate existing identities but also affirm or even make them. As Bourdieu (1991) wrote, appeals “contribute to producing what they apparently describe or designate” (p. 220). Ethno-racial appeals may create perceptions of linked fate (Dawson 1994) or groupness (Brubaker 2004)—the sense that fellow group members share important values and interests. A successful ethno-racial appeal would then temporarily transform an individual possessing many potentially relevant identities—class, gender, religion, sexuality, profession, and so on (Lipset 1981)—into a specifically ethno-racial voter, who approaches the political decisions she faces primarily through the lens of this one group membership.3 In tracing the production of group-specific capital, therefore, it is important to also track candidates’ strategies of conjuring ethno-racial groupness.

In sum, I argue that ethno-racial appeals constitute attempts to produce (or destroy) support for a political candidate on the basis of that candidate’s purported wealth or lack of group-specific political, cultural, and social capital (see Figure 1). Unlike the theory of racial priming, this model can account for explicit ethno-racial appeals, including those that might target non-White and White ethnic voters. In the following sections, I use this theory to analyze explicit ethno-racial appeals in campaign material from municipal elections in Chicago and Toronto. How do electoral campaigns craft appeals to make or destroy group-specific political capital? How do they draw on social or cultural capital to do so? How do they establish ethno-racial groupness?

**Cases, Data, and Method**

This article draws on a set of printed campaign material—flyers, brochures, door hangers, and direct mail pieces—from the 2014 Toronto and 2015 Chicago municipal elections. Before discussing the data and methods, I provide a very rough portrait of the two cities and their ethno-racial contexts. As Table 1 shows, Toronto has a larger White population than Chicago but boasts
Table 1. Chicago and Toronto: Ethno-Racial and Immigrant Composition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Chicago</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Toronto</th>
<th>#</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>2,722,586</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,691,665</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizens</td>
<td>2,405,655</td>
<td>88.4%</td>
<td></td>
<td>2,296,370</td>
<td>85.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First-generation immigrants</td>
<td>563,879</td>
<td>20.7%</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,377,465</td>
<td>51.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race/ethnicity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>167,575</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>887,835</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black or African-American</td>
<td>820,180</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td></td>
<td>239,850</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hispanic/Latino</td>
<td>789,713</td>
<td>29.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>77,160</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>890,322</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td></td>
<td>1,305,815</td>
<td>48.5</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note. Figures are based on the 2016 Canadian Census and five-year estimates (2013–2017) from the American Community Survey. “Asian,” “Black or African-American,” and “White” exclude Hispanics/Latinos. For Toronto figures, “Asian” does not include “West Asian” or “Arab”; “Hispanic/Latino” is based on self-identification as “Latin-American”; and White is based on self-identification as “not a visible minority.”

Figure 1. Explicit appeals and the production of group-specific capital.

many more immigrant residents, most of whom hold Canadian citizenship due to the country’s efficient naturalization regime (Bloemraad 2006). In terms of ethnic self-identification, the most frequent categories in Toronto—aside from “Canadian” and various British origins—are Chinese (12.4%), East Indian (7.5%), Italian (6.6%), and Filipino (6.0%). Most foreign-born in
Chicago are immigrants from Latin America (11.1% of the total population) or Asia (4.9%). Unlike Toronto, Chicago has a long history of severe racial marginalization and sometimes-violent intergroup conflict (e.g., Drake and Cayton 1993). Today, this history materializes partly in high and resilient levels of ethno-racial segregation (Logan 2013). This also means that city politics in Chicago exhibit a salient aspect of ethno-racial competition and conflict between African-Americans, Latinos, and Whites (Ferman 1996; Pinderhughes 2002), who each make up approximately 30% of the city’s population. By contrast, neither segregation nor intergroup conflict are very pronounced in Toronto (Fong 2006; Reitz and Lum 2006).

Every four years, Torontonians and Chicagoans elect their mayors and city council representatives through nonpartisan elections. Members of city council are referred to as city councillors in Toronto and aldermen in Chicago, a convenient terminological distinction I follow throughout the rest of the article. Chicago and Toronto are divided into 50 and 44 wards, respectively, each of which has one city council member representing approximately 55,000 residents. The electoral process in Chicago and Toronto differs in that Chicago holds runoff elections if no contender is able to secure at least 50% plus one vote in the general election. When that happens, the two most successful candidates enter into a runoff, which is held six weeks after the general election. In 2015, 183 Chicagoans ran for alderman and five for mayor. In Toronto, 358 city councilor and 65 mayoral candidates were listed on the ballot in 2014.4

Beginning the data collection in Toronto, I initially requested canvassing material from the campaigns by sending emails and letters. It quickly became clear that the response to these requests was insufficient, however, and I switched to soliciting the material in person. Research assistants and I repeatedly traversed the city to request canvassing material at campaign headquarters, making repeat visits if we initially found the offices closed. In total, the Toronto fieldwork yielded a data set that spans 145 city councilor and eight mayoral campaigns for a total of 370 documents. It includes canvassing material for 75% of the candidates who received at least 10% of the vote in their respective races. As one might expect, material for less successful candidates was difficult to procure—most of them had no campaign offices and many may not have produced canvassing material.

In Chicago, two research assistants solicited canvassing material at campaign headquarters beginning 10 days before the general and the runoff elections. I was able to supplement these data by downloading scanned campaign material that a political watchdog—www.aldertrack.com—posted on their website. In total, I gathered 417 documents from 109 aldermanic and four mayoral candidates during the general election and another 127 from 31
candidates during the runoff for total of 544 documents. Mirroring the Toronto results, the Chicago data include campaign material for 74% of the candidates who received at least 10% of the vote. For both cities together, the data set comprises 914 documents from 269 candidates.

I coded the material using qualitative data analysis software, searching for any references to race and ethnicity. Doing so, I discovered that the data set contained only one implicit appeal that fit Mendelberg’s (2001) theory of racial priming but instead many explicit appeals. Regarding explicit appeals, I used a slightly broader definition than Mendelberg (2001). In addition to ethno-racial nouns and adjectives, I included references to well-known ethno-racial organizations, such as the Chicago Defender (an African-American newspaper) and Rainbow PUSH (the Reverend Jesse Jackson’s movement organization), as well as reasonably self-evident ethno-racial symbols: national flags, iconic leaders (e.g., Cesar Chavez, Martin Luther King, Jr.), iconic cultural practices (e.g., the Bud Billiken Day Parade, an annual African-American event in Chicago), and certain uses of languages other than English that clearly invoke group membership (“from our family to yours, chag sameyach [‘happy holiday’ in Hebrew!”]). While I am confident that the appeals I identified are legible as such to group members, the boundary between explicit and implicit in the case of symbols is admittedly fluid. Due to a lack of cultural familiarity, I may have also overlooked some appeals that group members would recognize. Given these limitations, any frequencies I provide in the following sections should be interpreted with care.

Coding the data, I first followed a purely inductive approach (Corbin and Strauss 2008). After a round of open coding, which yielded a large set of highly specific codes, I aggregated the appeals into categories. While doing so, I confronted the emerging typology with existing theories and concepts, such as Bourdieu’s theory of capital and Brubaker’s concept of groupness (for a methodological discussion of this analysis strategy, see Tavory and Timmermans 2014). Thinking through the data against the backdrop of these theories, I eventually arrived at the model of ethno-racial appeals I introduced in the preceding sections. As a final step, I went through each instance of each code category to ensure that the framework fit all of its instantiations (Cressey 1953). In addition to appeal types, I also coded each appeal for the candidate’s ethno-racial category, the group the appeal targeted, and the ingroup or outgroup nature of the appeal.

To contextualize the campaign material, I drew on supplemental sources. Obviously, any political appeal is planned, deployed, and interpreted in a broader social context. Candidate decisions in making appeals depend on such things as whether there is an incumbent, who else is running for office, what groups are present in the ward, and what grievances and expectations
voters might have. While it is impossible here to do justice to the full complexity of racial politics in specific wards (see instead Doering 2017), even a modest amount of contextual information helps to illuminate ethno-racial appeals. Thus, I examined socio-demographic ward composition data and searched newspaper articles and blog posts that discussed the candidates, their opponents, and the office they were seeking.

Findings

Altogether, I identified explicit ethno-racial appeals in 117 (12.8%) of the 914 documents. Many of those documents contained multiple appeals, however, so that I can draw on a total of 215 appeals. Note that individual appeals can belong to several codes and even code categories at the same time. For instance, in one sentence of text, a candidate may establish his membership within a group, which serves to generate cultural capital, and underline his fight against the group’s social marginalization, which yields political capital. The data sets from Chicago and Toronto contained approximately the same proportion of documents that included ethno-racial appeals—13.8% and 11.4%, respectively.

The specific kinds of ethno-racial appeals I identified in the data fall into three categories, depending on whether they aim to produce (or destroy) cultural, social, or political capital. Table 2 provides an overview of the coding scheme and the frequencies of codes and their overarching categories. There were no differences in the distribution of ingroup and outgroup appeals. In both cities, I found about two documents containing appeals to ingroup voters for every document containing appeals to outgroups. However, different kinds of ethno-racial appeals preponderated—I discuss those differences in the final section of the analysis further below.

In the following sections, I describe and analyze specific strategies of making explicit ethno-racial appeals. I first examine how campaigns produce or destroy group-specific political capital. I then do the same for cultural capital, discussing also how cultural capital may be converted into political capital. Following this, I show how campaigns use group-specific social capital to strengthen or undercut candidates’ cultural or political capital. Finally, I contrast findings from the two cities and provide tentative explanations for the different strategies that candidates chose.

The Production of Political Capital

The most straightforward strategy for mobilizing voters through their ethno-racial categories is to depict oneself as a consistent defender of the group’s
interests. If it is possible for candidates to do this, they can make direct claims to group-specific political capital. I found five strategies candidates used to do so: They (1) established or (2) promised political advocacy on behalf of the group; they (3) invoked intergroup conflict, discrimination, or racism; and they (4) stressed their leadership outside of formal politics that improved the group’s economic standing, access to services, or professional advancement. In addition, campaigns sometimes launched (5) ethno-racial attacks that targeted their opponents’ group-specific political capital.

Establishing their status as political advocates, candidates show how they have fought on behalf of the group. Under ideal circumstances, they may be able to present concrete accomplishments. Several campaign mailers for Chicago’s incumbent Mayor Rahm Emanuel (e.g., doc.273) underscore his support for African-American Chicagoans during the rebuilding of a light rail line that serves the city’s majority-Black South Side.

### Table 2. Coding Scheme and Frequencies.

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<tr>
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<th>Chicago</th>
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<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Documents containing ethno-racial appeals</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ingroup appeals</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Outgroup appeals</td>
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<td>33</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cultural capital appeals</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishes advocacy for ethnic culture</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Establishes personal ethnic membership</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>41</td>
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<tr>
<td>Invokes ethnic culture/flag/food/history</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>20</td>
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<tr>
<td>Promises advocacy for ethnic culture</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Attacks opponent’s cultural capital</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
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<td>Political capital appeals</td>
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<td>48</td>
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<td>29</td>
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<td>Establishes political advocacy</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
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<td>Invokes intergroup conflict/discrimination/racism</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>13</td>
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<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Establishes leadership in ethnic economy/social services/professional advancement</td>
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<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
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<td>Attacks opponent’s political capital</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social capital appeals</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cites endorsement from civic/cultural leader/org.</td>
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<td>Cites endorsement from political leader/org.</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishes proximity to civic/cultural leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Establishes proximity to political leader</td>
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<td>24</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Attacks opponent’s social capital</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
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Note. Frequencies refer to the number of documents containing at least one instance of a given code.
Unlike the Dan Ryan [highway] renovation back in 2006 and 2007 [that occurred before Emanuel was first elected], Rahm [Emanuel] made sure nearly 30% of all contracts were awarded to minority firms of which 60.6%—more than $40 million—went specifically to African-American firms [highlighted in original] which hired hundreds of neighborhood residents to get the jobs done.

This statement emphasizes Emanuel’s personal advocacy on behalf of African-Americans. It was he who “made sure” that contracts were awarded to African-American-owned firms. This benefitted both these firms and “hundreds of neighborhood residents”—many of them Black, presumably. Emanuel’s advocacy can be expressed through concrete figures measuring the direct benefits his mayoralty has had for the African-American community. The campaign mailer is a statement of his political commitment to the material needs of one particular group and, thus, a direct source of group-specific political capital.

The same document also contains an attack on Emanuel’s opponent’s political capital among African-American voters. At the time of the 2015 Chicago municipal elections, several cities were issuing proposals to compete for the placement of Barack Obama’s presidential library. Mayor Emanuel had suggested two parkland sites on the South Side, while his opponent Jesús “Chuy” García had criticized these suggestions—but not the city’s bid for the library itself—because placing the library there would reduce park space (Spielman and Sweet 2015). Emanuel’s campaign construed García’s position as a threat to the city’s library bid:

Chuy Garcia opposed Rahm Emanuel’s plan to bring the Obama Library to Chicago. That means the library and 3,000 South Side jobs could go to New York. . . . Chuy Garcia said NO to South Side Obama Presidential Library. Say NO to Chuy Garcia.

Emanuel’s campaign, thus, creatively “misread” García’s criticism of Emanuel’s site proposals as a rejection of the city’s bid. Given the prevailing sense of pride in President Obama among African-Americans, as well as the promise of 3,000 South Side jobs, this attack by the Emanuel campaign aims to destroy García’s group-specific political capital among African-American voters. The attack suggests that Black voters cannot consider García their ally. García’s alleged opposition against the Obama library constitutes negative political capital.

Considering the overall context of the mayoral race, the Emanuel campaign’s dual strategy of boosting the incumbent’s political capital among African-Americans while undercutting García’s makes good sense. As a former chief of
staff for Obama, Emanuel had easily won election in 2011 with strong support from Black as well as White voters, but in the meantime his standing had suffered particularly among Black voters as a result of school closures and budget cuts. On the other hand, García had strong progressive credentials among African-American leaders, thus posing a realistic threat for Emanuel’s re-election (Knowles 2014). Consequently, the Emanuel campaign had to make significant efforts to regain support among African-Americans.

In about half of all cases, efforts to prove political advocacy entail references to intergroup conflict, discrimination, or racism. Candidates then show how they are advancing the group’s rights and interests against social resistance. A mailer for JoAnn Thompson (see Figure 2), the Black incumbent of Chicago’s 16th ward, promises to increase the number of Black students in the city’s best public schools.

JoAnn Thompson believes that Chicago has some of the best public schools in the country, but the best ones lack diversity and don’t have enough spots for African-American children. That’s why she’s fighting to ensure that all children have access to our city’s best schools, regardless of their skin color or where they live [highlighted in original].

Spots in Chicago’s best public schools—Thompson is probably referring to selective-enrollment Magnet Schools—are highly coveted by parents across the city. Given that there is only a finite number of spots, Thompson’s
fight to increase spots for African-American children is necessarily a zero-sum game. Thompson here claims that African-American children currently do not receive “enough” spots but that she will fight to increase their access, which constitutes a promise of political advocacy. The flyer also contains an endorsement from the city council’s Black caucus—I discuss endorsements in the section on social capital.

Candidates new to electoral politics can cite their commitment to political advocacy during their time as activists or professionals. Campaign material for Vetress Boyce (Chicago ward 24, doc.92) and Tara Stamps (Chicago ward 37, doc.795), two first-time aldermanic candidates, features images of the contenders attending rallies against police violence and holding signs saying “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” and “Black Lives Matter,” respectively. Another newcomer to electoral politics, Keiana Barrett (Chicago ward 7, doc.57) listed her experience as the “National Press Secretary for Rainbow PUSH” and the “Director of Communications for the Congressional Black Caucus in Washington DC.” Both Rainbow PUSH and the Congressional Black Caucus are well-known racial justice organizations; Barrett’s professional vitae, thus, makes her a proven Black activist. Candidates can, therefore, claim political capital without prior involvement in electoral politics.

Relatedly, candidates can invoke accomplishments outside of politics proper that have benefitted the group’s social situation. Often, these claims revolve around representation in the business world and professional advancement. Most appeals of this kind appear in campaign material from Toronto. For example, Cynthia Lai (Toronto ward 41, doc.431) identifies herself as “the first female Chinese-Canadian President of the Toronto Real Estate Board (TREB) in its 94 years history.” This statement credits Lai with breaking into a stratum of Canadian society that no (female) Chinese Canadian has been able to reach before her. Presumably, she thereby helped pave the way for other Chinese Canadians, who may, thus, put their trust in the ethnic trailblazer.

All of the appeals in this section aim to create or destroy group-specific political capital. Voters are asked to support candidates on the basis of the latter’s record or promises of protecting or advancing the group’s position in society. Consequently, these appeals generally also communicate a significant degree of groupness, especially when they include notions of conflict, discrimination, or racism. For example, the Emanuel campaign’s charge that the planned Obama Presidential Library is under attack demands African-American group closure around the incumbent mayor.

The Production of Cultural Capital

Ethno-racial appeals can also seek to generate or destroy group-specific cultural capital. Claims to cultural capital are rooted (as ingroup appeals) in
candidates’ authentic group membership or (as outgroup appeals) the ability to demonstrate respect and support for the group’s culture. I found five cultural capital strategies: (1) ethno-racial membership claims, (2) proof or (3) promises of cultural advocacy, (4) invocations of ethnic culture (including flags, cultural events, food, etc.), and (5) attacks on opponents’ cultural capital.

A basic strategy for ingroup appeals that create group-specific cultural capital is to claim group membership. Membership claims express, solidify, or underline candidates’ ethno-racial identities. They allow candidates to claim a certain amount of cultural capital that accrues to them as self-conscious group members. Thus, a brochure for city councilor candidate Nick Di Nizio (Toronto ward 7, doc.246) answers the question “who is Nick Di Nizio” with “Nick is the proud son of Italian immigrants.” Putting his ethnic identity first in revealing himself to voters, Di Nizio underscores his attachment to this identity and therefore also this group. In doing so, he establishes a baseline of group-specific cultural capital. Other candidates portray themselves as exemplary members of their group, which may yield a comparably larger amount of cultural capital. One flyer for the Jewish candidate Chani Aryeh-Bain (Toronto ward 15, doc.38) suggests, “Let’s send our first frum representative to City Hall.” Describing herself as “frum” (devoutly Jewish), Aryeh-Bain claims group-specific cultural capital. In addition, she makes an explicit attempt to create groupness: sending a first frum representative to City Hall is construed as a valuable political objective that should unite Jewish voters.

Often, membership claims appear together with invocations of ethnic cultural symbols, such as flags or ethnic food. George Papadakis (Toronto ward 31) showcases his cultural capital by citing Aristotle and Plato. One of his fliers (doc.641) states that Papadakis has “always believed in Plato’s axiom: One of the penalties for refusing to participate in politics is that you end up being governed by your inferiors.” The flyer ends with a quotation from Aristotle: “He who is to be a good ruler must first have been ruled.” Citing these eminent philosophers, Papadakis not only presents himself as an erudite political candidate but also demonstrates his commitment to his Greek origins. Michelle Baert (Chicago ward 45, doc.48) invokes food to accomplish a similar goal:

Like many in our neighborhood, my great-grandparents immigrated to the Chicagoland area from Ireland and Poland. . . . The third and fourth generation keeps the tradition alive and I always enjoy getting the pierogi, kulski and the kolacky prepped and ready to be shared.

As ethnic symbols, Aristotle and Plato as well as pierogi and kolacky signal ethnic pride and thereby produce group-specific cultural capital.
Membership claims are just as common in Chicago as in Toronto. However, candidates in Toronto make more efforts to show their support for the cultural life of ethnic groups. These appeals are quite consistent with Toronto’s self-conception as a multiculturalist mosaic, where groups maintain and celebrate immigrant ethnicities. Making ingroup appeals of this kind, candidates often depict themselves waving flags at ethnic parades or highlight their active involvement in (and thus support for) ethnic organizations, such as cultural associations (e.g., “Pescosolido Italian Social Club,” “St. Constance Polonia Club”) or religious congregations (e.g., “Santo Padre Pio Church Group,” “St. Demetrius Ukrainian Church”). All of these messages communicate the candidates’ efforts to maintain their ethnic groups’ cultural practices and identities.

Toronto candidates also frequently showcase their support for the cultural life of outgroups. Most commonly, candidates substantiate this support by citing endorsements (which I discuss in the following section) or by portraying their personal participation in cultural events. A canvassing card for Toronto ward 42 incumbent Raymond Cho (see Figure 3) shows the candidate at a whole range of outgroup events, including “multifaith prayers for Ukraine,” the “United Tamil Sports Club Award Night,” and a “Muslim Community Family Day Walkathon.” Having attended all of these gatherings, Cho showcases his cultural sensitivity and deference in relation to
ethnic outgroups, while also celebrating his personal ethnic identity (“Chinese New Year celebration”).

Finally, ethno-racial attacks can put authentic group membership in question and thus destroy cultural capital. One of Latino candidate Raul Reyes’s mailers (Chicago ward 15, doc.732) discusses certain features of his contender, Raymond Lopez. One of those alleged features: “Did you know?! No comprende, no habla Espanol. No podra comunicarse con su residentes Latinos.” In making this charge, Reyes tries to undermine Lopez’s group-specific cultural capital. Lopez’s purported inability to speak Spanish casts doubt on his status as a group member in good standing. This doubt, in turn, may then decimate Lopez’s group-specific political capital. After reading the assertion, a Latino voter may wonder whether Lopez can really be an advocate for Latino residents if he cannot even speak Spanish. In this way, negative cultural converts into negative political capital.

In sum, cultural capital appeals aim to produce or destroy a candidate’s group-specific cultural capital. These appeals engage the authenticity of group membership or, as outgroup appeals, the cultural awareness and respect that candidates exhibit for the group in question. As such, these appeals must be distinguished from those that directly produce political capital. Of course, cultural capital appeals also seek to mobilize voters through their ethno-racial group membership, but they do so indirectly, without communicating a candidate’s willingness to side with the group in cases of conflict or zero-sum competition. Nevertheless, especially when candidates running as self-identified political allies are not available—which is typically the case in Toronto—voters may decide that proud ingroup members or, at the very least, culturally sensitive outgroup candidates make for better political representatives than candidates who fail to reference the group’s ethno-racial category at all. Cultural capital has then successfully been transformed into political capital.

The Production of Social Capital

Explicit ethno-racial appeals also draw on social capital. Depending on their connections to other individuals and organizations, candidates may claim that they deserve to receive (or their opponents deserve to lose) group-specific cultural or political capital. Invoking social capital, candidates feature endorsements from (1) civic or cultural leaders and organizations and (2) political leaders or organizations. Aside from endorsements, candidates also underline their personal closeness to (3) civic or cultural leaders and (4) political leaders. Citing closeness rather than endorsements is important, for example, when candidates have ties to deceased leaders. Finally, as before,
campaigns can (5) attack their opponents for allegedly possessing negative social capital.

The most common form in which group-specific social capital appears in campaign material is the ethnic endorsement. Insofar as endorsers have political or cultural capital among members of their ethnic groups, they can temporarily transfer this capital by making endorsements. The receivers then use these endorsements to appeal to their ingroup (if the endorser and the endorsed are members of the same group) or to the outgroup to which which the endorser belongs.

In Chicago, many endorsements emanate from not only ethno-political organizations, such as the Chicago Defender (a long-running African-American newspaper), the Coalition of Black Trade Unionists, and the Latino Public Affairs committee, but also more obscure organizations, including the United Hellenic Voters of America and Jewish Chicago (an online magazine that appears to exist for the sole purpose of making endorsements). Candidates usually quote these endorsements simply by featuring the organizations’ logos on their campaign material. Interestingly, I found not a single organizational endorsement in Toronto. One reason for this may be that Toronto has fewer political organizations that are rooted in intergroup conflict—Black unions and newspapers, of course, exist at least in part as institutional bulwarks against racism. Ethno-cultural organizations are plentiful in Toronto but may avoid making political endorsements so as not to threaten their political neutrality or their tax status classification.

Another important source of endorsements are ethnic political leaders. Chicago mayoral incumbent Rahm Emanuel references an endorsement from President Obama; his opponent García invokes support from the Reverend Jesse Jackson. On a Spanish language mailer, the alderwoman of the 33rd ward, Deb Mell, features endorsements from U.S. Congressman Luis Gutierrez and State Senator Iris Y. Martinez (see Figure 4). Mell’s group-specific social capital is visualized on the mailer through her physical as well as emotional closeness (all are smiling) to these Latino leaders. In their testimony, printed in Spanish, the endorsers help Mell claim political capital by attesting to her Latino advocacy. Gutierrez states that Mell is “a proven champion in the defense of Latino issues both in Springfield and now for our great city,” while Martinez notes that Mell “will fight for the Latino community. Support Alderman Deb Mell because she is our voice for Chicago.” In addition to these endorsements, the mailer also cites Mell’s vote in favor of issuing drivers’ licenses to undocumented immigrants, which, given the context, constitutes a claim of political advocacy on behalf of Latinos. Since the 33rd ward is 48% Hispanic, these outgroup appeals were probably quite important for Mell’s electoral success.
Endorsements occur more frequently in the Chicago than the Toronto data. When candidates in Toronto feature endorsements, the endorsers are usually ethno-cultural rather than political leaders. For example, Shelley Carroll (Toronto ward 33, doc.147) cites an endorsement from Luigi Fracassi, the president of the Oriole Bocce Club, who states, “I have known Shelley Carroll for many years and lovingly call her my principessa!” Given that Fracassi’s name sounds Italian, that his club is oriented around an Italian game, and that he calls Carroll his “principessa,” this is clearly an ethnic endorsement, although not one that inspires significant groupness. Similarly, a brochure for John Filion (Toronto ward 23, doc.291) includes an endorsement from Mohammed Sheikholeslami, identified as the co-founder of the Toronto Iranians Community Group:

John [Filion] has been a supporter of the Iranian Fire Festival Celebration . . . the past 10 years. He encouraged us to have performances at the Toronto Centre for the Arts to showcase the richness of Iranian arts and build bridges of cross-cultural understanding.

By fielding these endorsements, Carroll and Filion seek to generate group-specific cultural capital. While no ingroup members, they nonetheless lay claim to cultural capital for their proven support of the groups’ cultural life. This support differs from political advocacy in that it remains limited to the level of civic and cultural vitality rather than the pursuit of group-based political interests, which might involve conflict and the selective distribution of scarce resources, as in Chicago.
In addition to endorsements, candidates establish their proximity to political or cultural leaders. A postcard for Chicago mayoral candidate Jesús “Chuy” García provides a good example (see Figure 5). The card shows García together with the Mexican-American Civil Rights leader Cesar Chavez and Harold Washington, Chicago’s first and so far only African-American mayor. Chavez has iconic status as a Latino leader throughout the United States. At least in Chicago, Harold Washington holds a similar status among African Americans. By showcasing García’s personal connection to these leaders (both of them deceased), the García campaign attempts to bestow their cultural and political capital among African-American and Latino voters onto García. In addition to that strategy, this document also features García waving a Mexican flag at a parade—demonstrating his ethnic pride—and an appeal for groupness (“Let’s get the first Latino Mayor of Chicago elected”).

Social capital appears in negative form when candidates have ties to individuals or organizations that group members despise. Consequently, campaigns sometimes attack rival candidates for having such ties. In revealing (or alleging) these ties, attacks destroy the target’s cultural or political capital. I found two such cases, both of them attacks against African-American candidates running in highly segregated African-American wards. One anonymously distributed flyer I found online (doc.167) attacks Willie Cochran, the incumbent alderman of Chicago ward 20, for his purported connection to a
The document includes the following passage:

Willie Cochran was a Sergeant, and second in command of the Jon Burge torture crew. Cochran either personally tortured Black men or knew about it and did nothing to stop it! . . . Hands up! Cochran down! [All highlighting as found in original]

Drawing a connection between Burge and Cochran here aims to disrupt Cochran’s standing among Black voters. If Black voters were to accept or seriously entertain these charges, they could not possibly consider Cochran authentically African-American or even a political advocate for the Black community. Thus, this attack conjures negative social capital to destroy Cochran’s political and cultural capital among Black voters. Pursuing a similar strategy, another anonymous flyer (also retrieved online) smears Black aldermanic candidate Tara Stamps (Chicago ward 37, doc.796) for working with mayoral candidate García, whom the flyer accuses of advancing the employment of Mexican- at the expense of African-Americans. The flyer seeks to activate a sense of labor market competition between Mexican- and African-Americans and then use this sense of threat to weaken Tara Stamps’s group-specific political capital on the basis of her connection with García. Consequently, campaigns can use social capital to either boost or reduce a candidate’s cultural or political capital depending on whether the tie in question links the candidate to an individual or organization with positive or negative recognition among the target audience.

Segregation and Ethno-Racial Appeals in Chicago and Toronto

As the preceding sections have revealed, ethno-racial appeals in Chicago are often more combative than those in Toronto. I now engage the differences between appeals in the two cities and discuss segregation as one important explanation. Returning to the figures in Table 2 shows that candidates in Toronto mostly take an indirect approach to ethno-racial mobilization, making cultural capital appeals that establish their outgroup respect or ingroup pride—93% of the Toronto documents that reference race and ethnicity contain such appeals. Along the same lines, when candidates in Toronto invoke their social capital, they mostly use it to establish group-specific cultural rather than political capital. Correspondingly, they rarely promise political advocacy on behalf of one particular group (12%). And only one (anonymous) document invoked
intergroup conflict and attacked a candidate for racism. In Chicago, candidates also make cultural capital appeals—47% of the documents that engage race and ethnicity include them—but they additionally profess their commitment to the interests of specific ethno-racial groups (48%) and use their social capital to access group-specific political rather than cultural capital (36% and 24%, respectively, contain political endorsements and statements of proximity to political leaders). In other words, candidates in Chicago more bluntly align with the group they address, not shying away from appeals that might alienate others, while Toronto candidates mostly pursue the less contentious strategy of celebrating ethnic identities.

One factor that facilitates combative ethno-racial appeals is residential segregation. In Toronto, no ward exhibits ethno-racial concentrations that approximate even those of less segregated Chicago wards (Fong 2006). In such a context, candidates have to create electoral coalitions and, thus, avoid potentially divisive ethno-partisan appeals (Nteta and Schaffner 2013). Instead, they celebrate a plethora of ethnic identities to prove their broad electability—recall Raymond Cho’s flyer (see Figure 3). By contrast, high levels of segregation in Chicago encourage strong racial appeals. For instance, in the section on political capital, I noted how the African-American candidates Vetress Boyce and Tara Stamps aligned themselves with the Black Lives Matter movement. Their wards are 86% and 79% non-Hispanic Black, respectively. Similarly, Latino candidate Raul Reyes attacked his competitor Raymond Lopez for his alleged inability to speak Spanish in a ward that is 72% Hispanic. Under these demographic conditions, candidates primarily compete over one ethno-racial constituency and consequently make forceful pledges of group support.

On the other hand, appeals in less segregated Chicago wards tend to exhibit restraint. Aldermanic candidate Juanita Irizarry (ward 26, doc.396) describes how, as a community organizer, she had “stood up to a wealthy developer who tried to discriminate against minorities and families with children by not renting to them.” Using the rather inclusive terms minorities and families with children, Irizarry’s message targets a broader audience than just Latino voters. Ward 26 is majority-Hispanic (62%) but also includes sizable shares of non-Hispanic Whites (24%) and Blacks (12%). Similarly, the Black incumbent of ward 4 Will Burns (doc.126) notes that during his prior work for the Urban League—an African-American advocacy organization—he focused on “protecting minority voting rights and creating jobs.” Ward 4 is 60% non-Hispanic Black.

Thus, even in combative Chicago, candidates adjust their appeals to the composition of the wards within which they seek office. As a result of high levels of segregation, however, ethno-racial politics overall are more factional than in Toronto. Of course, segregation is probably not the only factor
that shapes candidates’ choices when making ethno-racial appeal, but the findings strongly suggest that segregation matters a great deal.

**Discussion**

Electoral campaigns in both Chicago and Toronto—two very different cities—use a plethora of explicit appeals to rally non-White and White ethnic voters on the basis of their ethno-racial categories. Existing research in the tradition of racial priming theory has focused on the mobilization of White voters, implicit appeals, and experimental data (Huber and Lapinski 2006; Hutchings and Jardina 2009; Mendelberg 2001, 2008; Nteta, Lisi, and Tarsi 2016; Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek 2017; White 2007). As a result, scholars have largely overlooked the use of explicit ethno-racial appeals in the mobilization of non-White and White ethnic voters. This article reveals that such strategies are common in municipal campaigns. Some candidates make bellicose promises to fight for the rights and resources of one particular group. Others playfully combine multiple ethno-cultural traditions and symbols. Either way, these appeals are unconstrained by the imperative of covertness that the theory of racial priming has postulated in relation to appeals targeting White voters (Mendelberg 2001). And since the theory of racial priming is a theory of implicit appeals that mobilize subconsciously, it cannot explain how explicit appeals work.

Through an analysis of campaign material from Chicago and Toronto, I introduce a new theory of ethno-racial appeals. Drawing especially on Bourdieu (1991), I argue that appeals can be understood as an attempt to produce or destroy political capital. To do so, campaigns may invoke political legacies or promises but also draw on indirect sources, namely, cultural capital (the degree of authentic membership or deference) and social capital (ties to relevant individuals or organizations). In the context of ethno-racial politics, these types of political, cultural, and social capital can be group-specific insofar as their valuation differs across ethno-racial boundaries (Emirbayer and Desmond 2015). Furthermore, capital also appears in negative forms: Political legacies (“said NO to South Side Obama Presidential Library”), cultural traits (“no habla Espagnol”), and social ties (“second in command of the Jon Burge torture crew”) can represent liabilities in terms of group-specific capital. Finally, appeals both presuppose and create groupness, the belief that members of the category in question comprise a clearly bounded, homogeneous group that shares important traits and interests (Brubaker 2004). To summon voters through their ethno-racial category is to reinforce the corresponding identity (Tavory 2016).

These findings extend the literature on ethno-racial voting, especially in urban contexts. Many studies have demonstrated the strong impact of race
and ethnicity on municipal voting (Barreto 2007; Bird et al. 2016; Hajnal and Trounstine 2014; Philpot and Walton 2007; Wolfinger 1965), but the existing literature does not provide much information about the campaign strategies that help produce these patterns. Beyond the most well-known issues and slogans, specific campaign strategies remain elusive even in the abundant case study literature on urban politics (e.g., Ferman 1996; Kaufmann 2004; Stone 1989; but see Metz and Tate 1995). The findings in this article highlight ethno-racial appeals as one mechanism that probably contributes to ethnic voting among non-Whites and White ethnic voters. These appeals can revolve around group competition and division, but they may also simply invoke ethno-racial culture or even celebrate multicultural diversity. Incorporating this broader set of appeals that target voters of various backgrounds would expand the literature on ethno-racial politics, making it more comprehensive.

The findings also have implications for the literature on place and its social production (Brown-Saracino 2015; Gieryn 2000; Kaufman and Kaliner 2011; Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen 2000). Previous work in this tradition has occasionally pointed to the importance of political mobilization as a factor in reproducing or altering the characteristics of particular places (Doering 2017; Kaufman and Kaliner 2011; Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen 2000). For the cases of Chicago and Toronto, the findings suggest ethno-racial appeals as a mechanism of reproducing place-based culture. Candidates in Toronto primarily seek to accrue political capital through the detour of cultural capital—making membership claims, using cultural symbols, or expressing outgroup sensitivity and deference. In Chicago, promises to advance the situation of a particular group at the possible expense of others—which are direct sources of political capital—as well as references to conflict, discrimination, and racism are not uncommon in Black and Latino wards. These patterns are consistent with what we might assume on the basis of existing studies of Chicago and Toronto (Bloemraad 2006; Ferman 1996; Pinderhughes 2002; Reitz and Lum 2006), but this article can specify these patterns by showing how they are rooted in urban structure. Chicago elections bring out ethno-racial divisions because those divisions represent opportunities for political mobilization. In this highly segregated city, candidates in ward elections have incentives to signal resolute loyalty to one particular group, thus reproducing the city’s combative tradition. By contrast, comparably low levels of segregation in Toronto (Fong 2006) mean that aggressive appeals would alienate too many outgroup voters (Nteta and Schaffner 2013). Instead, candidates opt for innocuous portrayals of ethnic culture, thus turning Toronto elections into multiculturalist celebrations. In using the opportunities that their urban contexts afford, electoral campaigns, thus, reproduce place-based culture. To channel the words of
Molotch, Freudenburg, and Paulsen (2000), electoral campaigning makes Chicago even more like Chicago and Toronto even more like Toronto. On the basis of these findings, I propose that future scholarship closely track the qualities of ethno-racial campaigning in specific places and how such campaigning reshapes places. The political uses of race and ethnicity depend on their specific urban contexts. In majority African-American cities like Detroit and Baltimore, for example, ethno-racial mobilization probably works quite differently than it does in more multiracial cities like Chicago and New York. Furthermore, national contexts inform ethno-racial political opportunities. Detailed studies of campaigning may then show how the political characteristics of places either harden or soften, opening them to change (Kaufman and Kaliner 2011).

This paper has at least two limitations that future scholarship should try to overcome. First, I described and theorized explicit ethno-racial appeals, but I did not specify their effect on voting. This limitation mirrors the paper’s contribution. The racial priming literature relies on experiments, which allow researchers to obtain precise causal measurements while having to accept the fact that they reveal little about what kinds of appeals are made in the real world. By contrast, this article answers the latter question, but must draw on eclectic data from dozens of electoral races, each of which exhibits unique dynamics and features. Under these conditions, any attempt at statistical modeling would be fanciful. Nonetheless, going forward, scholars should incorporate explicit ethno-racial appeals in their research and seek to assess their influence (for a prior effort, see Metz and Tate 1995). Sophisticated quantitative techniques will help, but sociologists and political scientists should also undertake ethnographic research that may reveal how voters deliberate the political implications of ethno-racial categories. Experimental studies, on the other hand, can build on the field data this article has analyzed and described. For example, experimental scholars should include explicit appeals that target non-White and White ethnic voters. They should also broaden the range of appeals they field in their vignettes beyond direct promises to support (or punish) a particular group. As I have shown, ethno-racial appeals include efforts to establish cultural capital (such as membership claims) and social capital (such as endorsements). In drawing on field data for the purpose of study design, the experimental literature can more comprehensively and realistically reflect the ways in which race and ethnicity appear in political campaigning.

A second limitation is that this article relies on one single type of data—printed campaign material. Future research should examine appeals in other contexts, such as door-to-door campaigning and speeches. For example, one
could draw on the State of the City addresses that Holman (2016) has recently used to identify gendered styles of political rhetoric. Analyzing different types of data, additional types of appeals may emerge and their relative frequencies will likely differ. By its nature, print material is more durable than, for example, statements volunteers might make while canvassing. One could, thus, expect more ethno-racial attacks in environments where audiences are homogeneous and discourse leaves no material traces.

The theory of explicit ethno-racial appeals I have developed in this article provides rudimentary tools for a more encompassing analysis of ethno-racial politics that includes the mobilization of non-White and White ethnic voters. Increasingly, however, analyzing explicit appeals may also matter for the study of White mobilization. As scholars commenting on the most recent presidential election in the United States have remarked, explicit ethno-racial appeals are reappearing in campaigns that target Whites (Azari and Hetherington 2016; Bobo 2017; Schaffner, MacWilliams, and Nteta 2018). Famously, Donald Trump launched his presidential campaign by painting Mexican immigrants as criminals, drug dealers, and rapists. Since then, Trump has made a whole range of explicit ethno-racial appeals (for a list, see Leonhardt 2018). Given Trump’s electoral success and the fact that some candidates are following suit (e.g., Gabriel and Martin 2018), the racial priming literature’s hypothesis that explicit racial appeals to Whites backfire (Mendelberg 2001) has to be reevaluated. This phenomenon may transcend President Trump. Valentino, Neuner, and Vandenbroek (2017) have argued that, over recent years, Whites have become increasingly receptive to explicit appeals: “Many Whites now view themselves as an embattled and even disadvantaged group, and this has led to both strong in-group identity and a greater tolerance for expressions of hostility toward out-groups” (p. 12). If the authors’ assessment is correct, it implies that explicit ethno-racial appeals may become more widespread and important in American politics over the coming years. I did not find explicit appeals to White voters in campaign documents from Chicago and Toronto, two liberal cities with large non-White populations. Nonetheless, a Bourdieusian approach to ethno-racial appeals may also aid in the study of White mobilization.

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Notes

1. The same specificity of political capital should hold true for the boundaries of class, religion, region, and other factors, but, to my knowledge, Bourdieu did not explore this.

2. Constructivist scholars of race and ethnicity warn of the risk of reifying ethno-racial categories by treating them as self-conscious or at least homogeneous groups that exist in the real world (Brubaker 2004; Loveman 1999; Wimmer 2015). The notion of group-specific capital admittedly entails this risk. Nevertheless, in using the concept of group-specific capital to analyze ethno-racial appeals, I am not proposing that there is in fact far-reaching agreement among ethno-racial groups about the criteria for bestowing political capital. Instead, I argue that ethno-racial appeals summon individuals as members of cohesive groups—no matter whether this cohesion actually exists or not. Rather than assuming group homogeneity, I will show how candidates making ethno-racial appeals try to establish it.

3. Implicit ethno-racial appeals, by contrast, do not produce groupness according to Mendelberg (2001), who argues that implicit appeals shape political behavior subconsciously. They, therefore, cannot yield self-conscious group membership.

4. In Toronto, candidacy barriers are low (Taylor and McEleney 2019) and, thus, candidate fields tend to be more crowded than in Chicago. In Chicago in 2015, prospective candidates needed to present at least 473 valid signatures to run for alderman and 12,500 to run for mayor. Adding the qualifier “valid” is crucial because many candidates’ nominations are challenged in court. Are the signatures really from local residents? Were campaign staffers illegally remunerated for gathering petition signatures? Ultimately, many candidates are eliminated from the list of nominees for these and other infractions. The legal costs this process can entail impose an additional obstacle on running for office. Initially, 247 candidates for alderman filed nomination papers and 183 candidates were eventually included on the ballot. For the position of mayor, 10 candidates filed nomination papers, and five made it onto the ballot.

5. Patrick O’Connor, the incumbent of Chicago’s ward 40 on the city’s North Side, distributed a flyer that promised “no retreating in the war on crime” (doc.625) and called for harsher sentences for gun offenses. Ward 40 is a lower middle-class, predominantly White area, located to the west of several racially integrated neighborhoods that are troubled by gang violence (for analyses of racial politics
in these neighborhoods, see Doering 2016, 2017). Against this background, O’Connor’s flyer can be interpreted as an attempt to evoke White fears’ of racial integration.

6. I did not code simple images of group members as appeals, unless these individuals were iconic leaders or there were additional markers that reinforced the images’ ethno-racial connotations. For example, I did code a photo of Toronto city councilor Raymond Cho (see Figure 3) posing with a group of (presumably Tamil) children that was captioned “United Tamil Sports Club Award Night,” but I did not code an image of a White candidate speaking with a Black voter. I am not arguing that such images do not send ethno-racial messages, but I would submit that those messages are implicit rather than explicit. For a study that codes images of group members as appeals, see Nteta and Schaffner (2013).

7. For information about the socio-demographic composition of Toronto’s wards, see https://www.toronto.ca/city-government/data-research-maps/neighborhoods-communities/ward-profiles/ (accessed on April 2, 2018). Comparably comprehensive ward composition data for Chicago does not exist. However, for ethno-racial composition data, see https://www.wbez.org/shows/wbez-news/interactive-city-council-approved-Chicago-ward-map/52630c78-06ad-4e98-8aab-05bd3ca72e24 (accessed on April 2, 2018). All ward composition data cited throughout the article draw on these two sources.

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